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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 783 
Accident time: 09:32 Accident Date: 17/03/2008 
Where it occurred: AF/0308/01637, 
MF0180, Qalai Ahmad 




Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: None 
ID original source: (4) Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT INVOLVING [Demining 
group] DT# 02 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to investigate 
the demining accident involving [the Victim] the acting section leader of [Demining group] DT 
# 02. The accident occurred at 09:32 hours on 17 March 2008 at task # 
AF/0308/01637/MF0180 located in Qalai Ahmad Khan Village, Bagram District of Parwan 
Province. 
SUMMARY: 
MF# AF/0308/01637/MF0180 is part of a contaminated area which was recorded by LIS as 
SHA#3 of impacted community # 1222. The area is contaminated with AP mines by Russian 
forces for security of aircraft ammunition store located at the area during the year 1984. 
On 17 March 2008, at 09:32 am, a demining accident happened on [the Victim] a deminer of 
[Demining group] DT#2 who was appointed as acting section leader of section-02. 
According to claim of team, while the acting section leader was checking a lane cleared by 
one of team party and wanted to fix the location of a marking stone suddenly the stone fell 
down to un-cleared area and hit top of a mine/UXO causing it to explode. 
The acting section leader was dressed with PPE, but his visor was up, and as a result the 
victim acting section leader got injuries on his eye, leg, parts of his body. 
After applying first aid at the site the victim was shifted to Bagram Airbase Egyptian Hospital. 
The victim was admitted to the hospital at about 10:00 am and as his wounds were not much 
serious, he was discharged from the hospital next day of the accident. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
A. The accident point which was shown to investigation team is located at the vicinity of safety 
margin of two meters wide clearance lane. During clearance of the lane the relevant party has 
not found any hazardous component and also there is no any visible hazardous item around 
the cleared lane. 
B. The investigation team did not find any sign of uncontrolled detonation or any debris of the 
exploded item caused the accident in and around the crater of the explosion; this reveals that 
this crater has not been created by explosion of any hazardous device. 
C. The scenario stated by the team did not seem to be true; as If the stone has fallen from left 
hand of the victim, left side of his leg/body had to be injured, but the wounds of the victim are 
in front of his body and also his accompanying person has not received any injuries. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 969 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Body; minor Eye; minor Leg 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . acting section leader got injuries on 
his eye, leg, parts of his body". 
 
Analysis 
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as Management Control 
Inadequacy because the Victim was a Field supervisor and the investigators found that the 
details surrounding the accident were fabricated. The group’s management bears 
responsibility for controlling its field supervisors and ensuring that accidents are reported 
honestly so that lessons to avoid repetition can be derived from them. The Lessons Learned 
summary does not include recommendations for the demining group’s management to 
change, and so lacks any Lessons Learned - which is an unusual omission. 
The device in this accident is recorded as an AP blast mine because it was likely to have 
been a pressure operated device and the injuries are similar to AP blast injuries. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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